If Entry Strategy and Money go Together, What is the Right Side of the
  Coin? by Timsit, Jean-Philippe & Castiaux, Annick

	



	





 !"##$
#
%&& '(&&()#"'(&&





*
$$#"	$
+,*
$
-
$#
"
./0(((*
$1/"$2
#3445556
6

1 
 
If Entry Strategy and Money go Together,  
What is the Right Side of the Coin? 
 
Jean-Philippe TIMSIT 
CRP Henri Tudor 
29, avenue John F. Kennedy 
L-1855 Luxembourg-Kirchberg 
jean-philippe.timsit@tudor.lu 
Tél.: +352 42 59 91 – 1 
Fax: +352 42 59 91 - 777 
 
Annick CASTIAUX 
Louvain School of Management 
Université de Namur (FUNDP) 
Rempart de la Vierge 8 B-5000 Namur, Belgique  
annick.castiaux@fundp.ac.be 
Tel. +32 (0)81 72 48 80 
Fax +32 (0)81 72 48 40 
 
Abstract: 
The goal of this study is to determine which strategic model, either IO or RBV, allows firms 
to generate the highest performance on a competitive market. Contrasting with classical 
studies that mobilize analyses as VARCOMP, we deploy a multi-agent system simulating the 
behavior of firms adopting RBV or IO strategic models. For an equivalent proportion of both 
strategic orientations, we study the instant and total performances of the firms on hyper-
competitive markets. We show that the performance of best-performing IO firms, measured 
by the ROA, is higher in the short term, but that RBV firms obtain an average higher 
sustained performance, in the long term. Moreover, when they are in competition with IO 
firms on a highly profitable and competitive market, RBV firms which dare to enter such 
markets obtained generally the highest performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
If, for the firm, resources and products are two faces of the same coin (Wernerfelt, 1984: 
171), they are however not equivalent in term of performance. The question of the 
decomposition of performance is a key issue debated in the community of researchers in 
strategic management since many years. Indeed, the main function of firms is to generate 
performance, via the production of goods and services, to pay their owners and remunerate 
their employees (Durand, 2000). This question of performance, its underlying mechanisms 
and the appropriate level of analysis, fascinated economists and strategic management 
researchers since the 30s (Rumelt, 1974). 
 
However, the mechanisms underlying the generation of this performance are particularly 
complex, which explains that they are the subject of a considerable literature of several 
thousand contributions (Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Durand, 2000). Despite intense 
research, we still know little about the main sources of firm performance, and many questions 
remain unanswered. 
 
Since twenty-five years and the pioneering work of Schmalensee (1985), a debate highly 
animates the community of researchers in strategic management (Arend, 2009). Is the 
performance of the firm mainly explained by the market or by the firm, is it fundamentally 
external or internal? Many studies suggest analyzing the components of firm performance on 
these two main levels of analysis (Hawawini, Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003; McGahan & 
Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert, Phillips, & Westfall, 1996; Rumelt, 1991; 
Schmalensee, 1985; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988), most of them aiming to determine the 
main origin of the firm performance: industry, Strategic Business Unit (SBU) or the firm. 
 
This debate carries with it the roots of a considerable challenge (Durand, 2000: 139-149). 
Indeed, if the main sources of firm performance are the market, it would demonstrate that the 
Industrial Organization approach (IO), based on the classical paradigm Structure - Conduct - 
Performance (SCP ) (Bain, 1951, 1968; Mason, 1939, 1957), best explains the performance of 
the firm, and a strategy based on this conception is potentially more profitable (Porter, 1980a; 
Porter, 1980b, 1991, 1996). If, however, the firm level explains better the performance 
generated by the firm, it would show the superiority of the Resource-Based View approach 
(RBV) (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 
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1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) to explain the performance of the firm. So what is the strategic model 
which conducts the firms to generate more performance in a competitive market? 
 
The divergent conclusions of previous studies (McGahan et al. 1997; Roquebert et al. 1996; 
Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985) are hardly comparable because of the variety of methods 
of analysis of variance, numbers of years covered and sample sizes. These variations between 
the different studies do not allow the comparison between the empirical results, and do not 
guarantee the replicability to decide the question of the various components of performance, 
and thus the superiority of a possible model for other (Arend, 2009). 
 
To cope with this difficulty of collecting reliable empirical data to determine the comparative 
advantages of the IO and RBV strategic models, we propose to reverse the question. The 
objective of this research is to use a technique of multi-agent simulation (Gilbert & Conte, 
1994; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Harrison, Zhiang, Carroll, & Carley, 2007; Zott, 2003) to 
artificially produce data, over long periods, allowing flexibility and replicability of the 
analysis (Becker, Niehaves, & Klose, 2005; Moss & Edmonds, 2005). The model underlying 
our simulation considers two types of agents, in equal proportions, representing firms that 
operate in an environment of Pure Competition (PC). The first type of agents adopts decision 
rules corresponding to the IO strategic model, while the second type takes its strategic 
decisions according to RBV. Firms are acting in different market sizes with various expected 
return, then we look after a large number of cycles what is the strategy that has generated the 
highest performance. We led 1008 simulations, each including a series of 200 cycles (or 
periods). In each simulation, 200 firms and 20 markets interact. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. We first present the theoretical background of this 
research (2), and the two strategic models, IO and RBV (3). We then detail the methodology 
used and the variable component model (4), then we present and discuss the results (5, 6), 
before concluding (7).  
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2. THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The question of the appropriate level of analysis of firm performance is an important issue 
that concerns the community of researchers in strategic management for many years (Table 
1). It took a new turn since the pioneering contribution of Schmalensee (1985). Indeed, 
Schmalensee (1985) shows that the industry explains 19.5% of the variance in firm 
performance and that the share accounted for by the firm level is not significant. In view of 
this contribution, the performance of the firm would be mainly influenced by the market, 
which confirms the appropriateness of the IO model. In response to this study, conducted over 
one year and a very major error rate of nearly 80%, Rumelt (1991) replicated the analysis on 
the same database (FTC), but with four consecutive years. He showed (Rumelt, 1991: sample 
B) that industry accounts for only 4.03% of the variance in performance at firm level, instead 
of 19.5% in Schmalensee (1985). Besides this initial divergence, the share accounted for by 
performance levels and SBU firm, non-significant in the study by Schmalensee (1985), 
becomes significant in the study by Rumelt (1991): 1.64% of the variance explained by the 
firm and 44.17% of variance explained by the SBU. The proportion of variance explained by 
the same firm exceeds the share accounted for by industry, 17.9% against 10.2% in the study 
of Roquebert et al. (1996). 
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Table 1: Comparison of the results of key studies, in percentage of explained variance 
 % of the variance of 
the performance of 
firms by SBU explained 
by : 
Schmalensee 
(1985) 
 Rumelt 
(1991) Roquebert et Al. 
(1996) 
McGahan et Porter 
(1997) 
Hawawini et Al 
(2003)  Wernerfelt et Montgomery 
(1988) 
Sample Aa Sample Bb 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
Databases/nb of 
firms/nb of SBU/nb of 
industries 
FTC/456 
firms/1775 
SBU/242 
industries 
FTC/247 firms 
FTC/457 
firms/1774 
SBU/242 
industries 
Same, but with 
less SBU 
COMPUSTAT/6873 
firms/13398 SBU/942 
industries 
COMPUSTAT/7003 
firms/12296 
segments/628 industries 
Stern Stewart 
Dataset/562 
firms/55 
industries 
Methods OLS & VARCOMP OLS 
ANOVA & 
VARCOMP 
ANOVA & 
VARCOMP VARCOMP ANOVA & VARCOMP VARCOMP 
Performance  
measure 
rate of return Tobin’s Q rate of return rate of return ROA ROA ROA 
Years/Durations of the 
studies 1975/1 1976/1 1974-1977/4 1974-1977/4 1985-1991/7 1981-1994/14 1987-1996/10 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
Industry*year n.a. n.a. 7,84 5,38 2,3 n.a. 3,1 
Market share 0,6 -0,18 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,33 n.a. 
Industry 19,5 12,30 8,3 4,03 10,2 18,7 8,1 
Firm n.a. 2,65 (« focus 
effect ») 0,8 1,64 17,9 4,3 35,8 
SBU n.a. n.a. 46,37 44,17 37,1 31,7 (segments) n.a. 
Error 79,9 - 36,87 44,79 32 48,4 52,0 
Total 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 99,5 100 98,0 
 
a : Rumelt sample, very close from Schmalensee’s (1985) 
b : Rumelt sample, larger than Schmalensee’s (1985) 
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The synthesis of key contributions (Table 1) highlights two key points. Firstly, the analysis of 
various studies presented Table 1 shows that firm performance attributable to the market 
level never exceeds 20%. It varies from 4.03% (Rumelt, 1991) to 19.5% (Schmalensee, 
1985), which is consistent with Powell (1996). This result may seem surprising because a 
priori rather low compared to the share performance that the market does not explain, 
averaging over 80%. How to explain that such a small share of performance be explained? 
Thus, if the effects of the industry (Bain, 1951, 1968; Mason, 1939, 1957; Porter, 1980a; 
Porter, 1979, 1980b, 1996, 2008) cannot explain most of the variance in performance, what 
other factors can do it? 
 
The second striking point is the difficult comparison between most of these works. Indeed, 
first of all, the methods are comparable, but different. The standard error is large, the 
smoothness of the method can improve the significance levels with a direct effect on results. 
Moreover, as levels of analysis, the durations of the studies vary. But the structure of a 
market varies with the intensity of competition (Mason, 1957). The period of analysis is vital. 
Finally, sample sizes vary as do sectors, and it is difficult to compare shares variance between 
several sectors where growth rates vary greatly from one sector to another. Therefore, the 
comparison between these studies does not guarantee the precision and replicability of thumb 
for deciding on the question of the different components of performance. 
 
In the literature, the logic of the approach is still conducted through similar analysis of 
variance components (VARCOMP), in the light of that used by Schmalensee (1985). The 
analysis usually focuses on the overall performance of many multi-product firms, a large 
number of industries, determining how the variance of performance breaks down market, 
firm and SBU. This logic has shown, in our view, its limitations. Performance is measured 
mostly by the accounting measure of profitability, that is to say the “Return On Assets” 
(ROA), with the exception of Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) who use Tobin’s Q. 
 
The best would be to benefit from a comparison between the strategy adopted by a firm at t 
time, and its performance after several periods. However, the problem is twofold. Firstly, it is 
complex to apply to decision makers all the information about the strategy they have decided 
to run for years to come, and then compare it to as the years passed with the performance 
occurred. Indeed, this information is vital to the firm and is therefore not transmitted. In 
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addition, the firm undergoes external changes, especially regarding target markets, and 
internal, for example in management teams, which influence the strategic concepts. Strategies 
thus undergo inflections that must be taken into account. Alternatively, ask a manager to 
explain the choices made in the past gives a result very questionable in light of the effects of 
post hoc rationalization. 
 
The two main slopes of strategic management are rivals to explain the performance and 
growth of the firm. To untangle this hank, it is necessary to decompose and compare the two 
different generation mechanisms of performance, according to the two strategic models 
studied. 
 
3. TWO RIVAL CONCEPTIONS 
When Wernerfelt chose purposely the first sentence of his seminal article "For the firm, 
resources and products are two sides of the same coin" (Wernerfelt, 1984), he highlighted the 
two opposing dimensions of strategic management, still young science at the time. By 
"resources", he means the internal conception of the strategic modeling, based on an analysis 
of the components of the firm; and "products ", an external conception, based on an analysis 
of the environment. 
 
These two strategic models are not homogeneous but both fragmented, based on strong 
conceptual foundations. The IO approach is a dome theory covering five separate streams 
(Conner, 1991b): the neoclassical theory's perfect competition model (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972), the Bain and Mason model (Bain, 1951, 1968; Mason, 1939, 1957), and the responses 
of Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1951) and the School of Chicago , and finally the transaction 
costs theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Williamson, 1991). To these streams, we can add 
marginally the contestable markets theory (Baumol, 1982; Baumol & Willig, 1981). The 
foundations of the IO model are based on the paradigm Structure-Conduct-Performance, 
initiated by Mason (Mason, 1939, 1957) and Bain (Bain, 1951, 1968), and then extended and 
generalized by Porter (Porter, 1980a; Porter, 1979, 1991, 1996), for example through the 
analysis of competitive forces. This model is based on the fact that market structure 
determines the behavior of firms and thus their performance. Strategic modeling is initiated 
by an external analysis to the firm. 
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The resource-based theory takes its origins in the work of Penrose (Penrose, 1955; Penrose, 
1952; Penrose, 1959), in reaction to the neoclassical conception of the firm as a black box, 
and the model of pure competition, one of the foundation of IO. It has been later popularized 
by Wernerfelt (1984), but especially by Barney (1986, 1991). According to RBV, the firm is 
composed of resources and distinctive capabilities that make it unique in its market. In this 
conception, the growth of the firm takes mainly two paths. The first one is the accumulation 
and growth by deploying resources. The second is the creation of value by combining 
resources, thanks to the skills and abilities held by the firm (Amit et al., 1993; Barney, 1991; 
Barney, 1986, 1996; Conner, 1991a; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
However, the resources of the firm are indivisible (Penrose, 1959: 67-71) and are not 
homogeneous as factors of production can be. This conception of the firm also gave rise to 
several approaches like Knowledge-Based View (KBV) (Foss & Knudsen, 2003; Grant, 
1996; Spender, 1996; Spender & Grant, 1996; Tsoukas, 1996), Competence-Based View 
(CBC) (Hamel, 1991; Hamel & Heene, 1994; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), or Dynamic 
capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat, Finkelstein, & Mitchell, 2007; Teece, 2007; 
Teece et al., 1997), to name a few. 
 
This study focuses on the fundamentals of these two currents. On the IO approach, we focus 
on the classical origins of this strategic model, namely the work of Mason (1939, 1957), Bain 
(1951, 1968) and Porter (1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1991, 1996). For the RBV, we focus again on 
its conceptual foundations, principally on the contributions of Penrose (1959), Wernerfelt 
(1984, 1994) and Barney (1986, 1991). 
 
This study, we focus specifically on two key points: the level of analysis and mechanisms of 
performance generation across the sources of competitive advantage. 
 
Level of analysis 
Originally, Mason (1939, 1957) raises the market as the relevant level to analyze the 
performance of firms, a model subsequently developed and deepened by Bain (1951, 1954) 
and popularized by Porter (1979, 1980, 1981). This design lays the foundation of the 
industrial organization approach (IO) arguing that the market structure, measured primarily 
by the concentration of producers, the concentration of buyers, the degree of differentiation 
between products and the conditions of entry for new competitors (Durand, 1997, 2000; 
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Scherer & Ross, 1990), determines the behavior of players. This behavior has the direct 
consequence of firm performance. Based on this view, Porter (1979, 1980, 1981) provides an 
analysis of market structure based on five competitive forces (Porter, 1991, 1996, 2008). 
 
Unlike the IO model, the resources conception conceives the firm as the relevant level of 
analysis. Indeed, Penrose (1959) presents the firm as a collection of resources and skills. This 
design is a reaction to the neoclassical approach that models the behavior of agents in a 
market by reducing the firm to a black box modeled by a production function Q = f (K, L). 
Thus, as the RBV model (Amit et al., 1993; Barney, 1991; Barney, 1997; Barney, 1986; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984), the 
appropriate level of strategic analysis is the firm because it is combining its resources the 
firm product performance (Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). 
 
Mechanisms of performance generation 
The question of the sources of the competitive advantage is an important point of opposition 
between the IO and RBV models. The I.O. analysis conceives that the market can produce a 
total amount of profit. This total profit is shared among all firms in the market. The goal of 
every firm is to access a share of profit above the average profit by acting on its suppliers and 
customers, but also on its competitors, and thereby altering the market structure to improve 
its position on it. Through this, the objective is being to reach a situation where monopoly 
rents are maximized (Porter, 1991, 1996; Ricardo, 1817). The greater the number of 
competitors is reduced, the larger the share of profit on the remaining firms increases. A rent, 
as an extra profit, is generated by the increased market power. This rent is the extra profit 
which firms in a market can access, due to the specific configuration of market monopoly or 
duopoly example (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Ricardo, 1817). However, the larger the share 
of profit by business grows, it makes the market more attractive, attracting companies from 
other markets (Baumol, 1982; Baumol et al., 1981). If these firms enter the market, they will 
lower the average profit share. The goal of firms is to reduce the number of competitors in the 
market, while protecting themselves by barriers to market entry, thus discouraging other 
firms from entering. 
 
Alternatively, the RBV approach conceives the firm as level of analysis, it is at this level that 
plays the issue of competitive advantage. The firm is composed of resources that constitute 
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its substance (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984. These resources are combined using the skills 
and capabilities to produce goods and services to the market (Amit et al., 1993; Barney, 
1991; Dierickx et al., 1989; Durand, 1997; Grant, 1991; Hamel et al., 1994; Makadok, 2001; 
Peteraf & Barney, 2003; Teece et al., 1997). Some of the resources that make up the firm 
have particular characteristics (Barney, 1991; Barney, 1997): they are valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN). The source of competitive advantage is in the 
possession of these resources VRIN (Barney, 1997)and in the ability of the firm to implement 
them, that is to say, to combine and deploy them in mobilizing routines more or less refined 
(Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
 
For Barney and the main theorists of RBV, the analysis of competitive market forces do not 
give enough information to the firms to build a competitive advantage (Barney, 1986). The 
superiority of the RBV model on the IO conception lies in the analysis of resources and skills 
that form the firm (Barney, 1986: 1234). Analysis of Barney specifically stresses that 
strategic choices are mainly derived from the analysis of skills and unique capabilities of the 
firm rather than the environment.  
 
IO and RBV approaches on levels of analysis and design of competitive advantage are very 
different, so the consequences on the formulation of the strategy are very important. These 
differences have a significant impact on many segments of strategic thinking such as the 
structure of the firm, the diagnosis of competitive forces, or the value creation mechanisms. 
However, the point at which this difference is in our opinion the most glaring is the 
implementation of the strategy for market entry. According to pursue that strategy is based 
primarily on a market analysis or an analysis of the firm, reasoning led to produce the 
performance will be drastically different, even opposite (Teece et al., 1997). This question of 
formulating the entry strategy is in our opinion the most striking feature between the two 
behaviors, it is here that we will focus the simulation. 
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4. METHODS 
Our goal is to understand the individual behaviors of and interactions between firms, markets 
and resources; in this framework, the ideal method is the agent-based simulation technique 
(Becker et al., 2005; Demazeau & Müller, 1990). This method is based on the creation of 
different agents following behavior and interaction rules and evolving in a common 
environment. In our case, agents are firms and markets on which firms can evolve. 
 
Building the simulation requires a preliminary modeling of key agents (firms, markets) as 
well as the determination of the dependent variable, firms' performance, and the independent 
variables. The analyzed firms evolve in an environment made of markets on which they 
commercialize goods and services in order to generate performance. To sustain their 
production activity, they must obtain assets in order to maintain their activity. Thus, the 
simulation has to take into account the modeling of the environment components (a market of 
goods and services) and of the behavior of firms in relationship with the market of strategic 
factors (Barney, 1986). 
 
To simplify the model and to facilitate resource representation, we reduced their number in 
comparison with the usual typology of resources as found in the literature (Barney, 1986; 
Grant, 1991). We opted for a financial resource as well as three other kinds of resources, 
which could be organizational, human or physical resources. We chose to attribute a color to 
those three resource types in order to represent them visually by the three fundamental colors: 
red, green and blue. As a matter of fact, numerical simulations provide the opportunity to 
generate visual representation of agents’ evolution. We created a Youtube account where 
readers can visualize several simulations performed for this research (see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4HjrLsBRXQ). [Lien non fonctionel pour le moment] 
 
To summaries, the key elements of the model are thus firms' performance, markets 
characteristics, firms' behaviors and strategic factors market. We explain each of those 
elements in detail in the following subsections. 
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Firms' performance 
The question of performance and its multiple measures was remarkably treated in the 
classical paper of Capon et al. (1990). Generally, in strategy literature, the measure of 
performance is the economic profitability modeled by the ROA (“Return on assets”) (Lee & 
Madhavan, 2010), which leads to reduce the total financial performance of the firm by the 
total value of its assets, in order to determine the produced wealth by asset unit. We align 
ourselves on this common practice, using the ROA to measure our firms' performance, which 
also helps us to control size effects (as amounts of assets) between firms. The ROA is 
computed as the ratio between net revenues and assets. We compute each firm's profit as 
follows:  
 
Π = TR – TC 
 
where: 
- Π is the profit; 
- TR is the total revenue computed as the total number of sold goods and 
services, multiplied by their price, i.e. P*Q; 
- TC are the total costs supported by the firm, following production. 
 
We divide the firm's profit by the value of its resource portfolio, obtaining then the 
profitability by unit of assets, which measures the ROA. However, as our simulation takes 
place on a large number of periods, we compute two measures of this performance: the 
instant performance Pi(tj) obtained at each period: 
 
 
where RESit is the total value of the resources owned by firm i on time tj. 
We also compute a total performance, which is an actualized value of the ROA from the 
beginning of the simulation, Pti(tn): 
 
 
 
We have thus two indicators at our disposal: the instant performance of the firm, allowing, at 
each period, to evaluate firms' performance following their strategic choice, and the total 
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performance of firms allowing to evaluate each strategic type for the duration of the 
simulation. 
 
Markets in Pure Competition 
Firms' performance is linked to numerous parameters (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995) and all 
firms interact in an environment made of numerous markets submitted to considerable forces. 
Among others, the location of confrontation of those forces, and thus the nature of the 
analyzed markets is fundamental. In order to simplify the model, we chose to simulate an 
environment made of markets respecting the conditions of Pure and Perfect Competition 
(PPC): 
• Atomicity: All firms on a given market are « price taker » and we consider P as fixed 
to P=1; only Q is variable ; 
• Homogeneity: all firms manufacture the same product on a given market; 
• Mobility of production factors: Production factors move freely and there is a 
resource market called Market of Strategic Factors (SFM)(Barney, 1986); 
• Transparency: information is perfect, without costs. 
 
Nevertheless, the perfect information hypothesis raises several issues. Following path 
dependency (Arena & Lazaric, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1973; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 
1990), and thus firms' age, their analysis of market evolution and potential future value of 
resources (both inside the firm and on the SFM) evolves. We thus decided to relax the perfect 
information hypothesis introducing a random coefficient for two factors: the realization of an 
anticipated performance by a given firm and the evolution of resource prices, initially 
submitted to law of supply and demand. Relaxing this hypothesis has a strong impact on the 
way the SFM is working. As a matter of fact, firms do not acquire resources exclusively 
following their value on t, but also following their anticipated value on t+1.  
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Firms' behavior 
As we said before, we analyze the strategic behavior of firms through their entry strategy on 
markets. A firm behaving following I.O. principles will formulate its entry strategy as follows 
(Teece et al., 1997): 
1- Choice of a market following its attractiveness (structure: number of competitors, 
reachable profit share, …); 
2- Choice of an entry strategy based on the strategy of market competitors; 
3- Acquisition of needed resources to be competitive on the market (if those resources 
are not yet in the firm's portfolio). 
 
A firm behaving following RBV principles will formulate its entry strategy differently:  
1- Identification of the specific resource providing itself with a competitive advantage; 
2- Determination of markets where those resources can lead to the highest profits; 
3- Evaluation of maximal profits generated by the strategic assets among the following 
possible actions: 
a. Market entry 
b. Selling of the resource on the SFM 
c. Selling of resource outputs 
 
Where the IO firm initiates its strategy by a diagnostic of the competition field, the RBV firm 
begins with a diagnostic of its resources and routines. 
 
Strategic Factor Markets 
Firms can acquire or sell resources on the SFM (Barney, 1986). Following the relaxation of 
the perfect information hypothesis, the purchase cost of resources is fixed by the law of 
supply and demand, tempered with a partially random factor, linked to firms' age. As a matter 
of fact, regarding path dependency, firms' age conditions the constitution of resource 
collection and the formation of organizational competencies and capacity allowing the 
implementation of those resources (Arena et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 1973; Teece et al., 1997; 
Winter, 1990). 
 
The SFM is a market where resources required to implement a strategy are bought. It is 
composed of firms, themselves composed of resources. Those resources – the word “assets” 
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is more relevant when they do not belong to a firm – are produced by institutions, as 
universities or schools (human resources). All strategies where the acquisition of resources is 
require need to call this SFM into play (Barney, 1986). 
 
Firm's performance do not only depend on the compliance between the strategy and the 
market, but also on the strategy implementation costs. Firms estimate the future value of the 
acquired strategic resources following the resources they owe, their competencies and 
capacities, and the strategy they intend to implement. The resource purchase decision is thus 
not only based on an intrinsic cost, but also on an anticipated future value, and by the law of 
supply and demand. 
 
If suppliers and demanders have the same vision of the future value of the resource, then the 
price of the resource will approximately correspond to its value. Otherwise, suppliers will sell 
the resource at a higher (respectively lower) price, and / or buyers will buy the resource 
above (respectively below) its value, or the resource will not find a buyer. Thus, some 
resources will be very costly because several firms anticipate a high future value creation, 
while other resources are under-evaluated because not so demanded in the implemented 
strategies. 
 
However, the evaluation of resource future values is linked to PPC, which assumes perfect 
information: the same information for all actors, at the same time, and thus the same vision of 
future winning strategies. This is not true. Information being imperfect, the SFM includes a 
certain degree of uncertainty. For Barney (1986), one of the important success criteria is thus 
luck. Luck can provide an over-performance through the lucky acquisition of the winning 
resources on the SFM. 
 
To summarize, the value of a resource on a SFM is linked to its cost and its value anticipated 
by the firms following the formulated strategies. If a resource s affordable, but numerous 
firms formulate strategies using this resource, anticipating an important profitability at term, 
then the resource value on the SFM will rise drastically. However, this hypothesis is linked to 
perfect information. We relaxed this hypothesis. Moreover, the impact of chance in the 
acquisition of resources and evolution of markets, allowing an unpredictable success or 
failure, has also to be taken into account.  
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Technical characteristics of the simulations 
The technical characteristics of the simulation are as follows. As modeling software, we used 
NetLogo version 4.1. We led 1008 simulations, each including a series of 200 cycles (or 
periods). In each simulation, 200 firms and 20 markets interact. Markets can have 3 different 
sizes, following the number of shares they include: 10, 100 or 1000. Those market shares 
represent the demand intensity for each market. Firms are represented by arrows which color 
is the combination of their amount of red, green and blue resources. Initially, firms receive a 
random combination of those resources, but this combination – and thus the firm's color – 
evolves through cycles. Markets are represented by circles with different diameters following 
their size and with different colors following the resources they require from firms to act 
efficiently – i.e. produce goods and services – on them. 
 
A given firm I is characterized by (1) a strategic orientation IO or RBV, fixed through time 
and determining their entry modalities on one market or another; (2) financial resources, 
initially identical for all firms and evolving following resource purchases and, if any, 
cumulated profits; (3) resources of three types (ri(t), gi(t), bi(t)), of which they receive a 
random initial stock and that they can buy or sell on the SFM following their needs, i.e. the 
requirements of the market on which they try a venture or the possible financial difficulties 
they meet. Each firm takes a different color, representing its resource collection, and 
reflecting its unique combination of red, green and blue resources; (4) an instant performance 
Pi(t), measured by the ROA, corresponding to the profit realized on t, divided by the total 
value of the firm's resources at the same time; (5) a total performance PTi(t), measured by the 
summation of instant ROA, corresponding to the sum of instant performances from the initial 
time. 
 
A market j is characterized by (1) a fixed size NPj corresponding to the number of available 
market shares; (2) a value of market shares vj(t) varying through time following the 
concentration of firms on the market; (3) fixed access conditions, simulated by a minimal 
level of the three fundamental resources, Rj, Gj et Bj, that firms must owe to enter this market. 
 
Firms and markets interact, as shown on Figure 1, by the intermediary of the SFM, on which 
prices evolve following the law of supply (available stocks on the SFM and inside firms) and 
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demand (access requirements by all markets), and of which stocks evolve following 
purchases and sales performed by firms to penetrate a market or restore their finances. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Model components and mutual interactions 
 
 
On a given time t, according to whether the strategic orientation of the firm is IO or RBV, it 
will look for a market using different behavioral rules. If firm I is IO, it will search, among 
the M available markets, the one promising the highest profit, computing:  
 
 
 
If firm is RBV, it will look for the market for which its collection of resources provides the 
best asset to face the market entrance barriers (i.e. the required resources to enter the market). 
Thus, it will search, among the M available market, the one for which it already owes the 
necessary resources or, if no market meets this condition, the one minimizing the resource 
investment. We simulated this search by computing the Euclidian distance between the firm's 
resource portfolio and the market's entrance barrier, as follows:  
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where: 
 
 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
After conducting 1008 simulations of 200 cycles, we present the results in two tables. Table 2 
summarizes the raw results of the simulations. This study simulates strategies in 
hypercompetitive markets, firms acting against each other. We therefore present table 3 
which summarizes the simulation results in relative values. Each of these results is presented 
in two parts, period 20 and period 200, to highlight the direct effects of market entry, and the 
consequences of long-term strategies. 
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Tableau 2: Synthesis of the raw results and comparison between cycle 20 and cycle 200, for the 1008 simulations 
 
Nb. 
IO 
in 
best 
10 
After 
20 
cycles 
Nb. 
RBV 
in 
best 
10 
After 
20 
cycles 
Nb. 
IO 
in 
best 
10 
After 
200 
cycles 
Nb. 
RBV 
in 
best 
10 
After 
200 
cycles 
Perf. 
1st 
IO 
After 
20 cycles 
Perf. 
1st 
IO 
After 
200 
cycles 
Perf. 
1st 
RBV 
After 
20 cycles 
Perf. 
1st 
RBV 
After 
200 cycles 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
IO 
After 
20 cycles 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
IO 
After 
200 
cycles 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
RBV 
After 
20 cycles 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
RBV 
After 
200 cycles 
Average 5,55 4,45 3,93 6,07 3447,23 5582,62 3528,57 6654,33 3146,82 5339,84 3011,54 5585,26 
St. dev. 2,71 2,71 3,27 3,27 253,39 294,05 458,88 937,24 193,73 292,25 320,26 616,07 
Variance 7,36 7,36 10,68 10,68 64204,78 86465,27 210568,59 878420,96 37530,87 85412,89 102567,34 379540,78 
Median 6,00 4,00 4,00 6,00 3444,99 5597,86 3483,70 6587,88 3156,50 5350,85 3052,31 5668,28 
Maxima 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 4152,83 6432,88 4962,37 8490,24 3673,89 6098,50 3715,42 6812,13 
Minima 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2673,57 4535,61 1463,60 1827,73 2533,42 4298,64 1002,85 1560,73 
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Table 3: Synthesis of the relative results, and comparison between cycle 20 and cycle 200, for the 1008 simulations1 
 
Rel diff 
between best 
IO and best 
RBVa 
After 20 
cycles 
Rel diff 
between best 
IO and best 
RBVa 
After 200 
cycles 
Rel diff between 
av 5 best IO and 
av 5 best RBVb 
After 20 cycles 
Rel diff between 
av 5 best IO and 
av 5 best RBVb 
After 200 cycles 
Rel diff between 
av 10 best IO 
and av 10 best 
RBVc 
After 20 cycles 
Rel diff between 
av 10 best IO 
and av 10 best 
RBVc 
After 200 cycles 
Rel diff av 
all IO and 
av all RBVd 
After 20 
cycles 
Rel diff av 
all IO and 
av all RBVd 
After 200 
cycles 
Average -0,01 -0,14 0,03 -0,08 0,06 -0,02 0,82 0,66 
St. dev. 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,17 0,20 0,20 1,05 0,89 
Variance 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 1,09 0,80 
Median -0,02 -0,15 0,00 -0,10 0,03 -0,05 0,66 0,51 
Maxima 1,42 2,08 1,98 2,35 2,37 2,60 19,42 14,25 
Minima -0,37 -0,42 -0,28 -0,36 -0,24 -0,32 -0,05 -0,16 
Nb of cases where  
IO > RBV 443,00 143,00 511,00 195,00 605,00 331,00 1007,00 994,00 
Nb of cases where 
RBV > IO 565,00 865,00 497,00 813,00 403,00 677,00 1,00 14,00 
% of cases where 
IO > RBV 43,95% 14,19 % 50,69% 19,35 % 60,02% 32,84 % 99,90% 98,61 % 
% of cases where  
RBV > IO 56,05% 85,81 % 49,31% 80,65 % 39,98% 67,16 % 0,10% 1,39 % 
 
Where : 
a : Relative difference between the best performing IO and RBV firms : (Best IO – Best RBV)/Best RBV  
b : Relative difference between the average performance of the 5 best performing IO and RBV firms: (Best5IO – Best5RBV) / Best5RBV 
c : Relative difference between the average performance of 10 best performing IO and RBV firms : (Best10IO – Best10RBV) / Best10RBV 
d : Relative difference between the average performance of all remaining IO and RBV firms : (AvIO – AvRBV) / AvRB 
                                                 
1
 See appendices 1 & 2 for full results 
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The first point to note in analyzing the raw results is the dramatic twist for the 10 best 
performing firms between period 20 and period 200. Indeed, averaged over the 1008 
simulations, in period 20, there are 5.55 IO firms in the 10 best performing companies, 
against 4.45 RBV firms. This shows that IO firms access higher performance faster than RBV 
firms, on average. However, it seems that they do not succeed to maintain this performance. 
Indeed, at period 200, there are on average no more than 3.93 IO firms present in the top 10 
best performing firms, against 6.07 RBV firms.  
 
A second observation is that RBV firms succeed to grow more steeply during the period. 
Indeed, if we compare the performance (in value) of the top 10 firms in each strategic 
orientation between cycle 20 and cycle 200, IO firms present an average increase of 41% 
(from 3146.82 to 5339.84). In contrast, RBV firms demonstrate an average increase of 46%, 
i.e. nearly 5 points more than IO firms, from an average performance of 3011.54, lower than 
IO firms’ average performance, to an average performance of 5585.26 higher than IO firms’ 
average performance. 
 
Table 3 analysis goes in the same direction. Indeed, if one examines the column summarizing 
what strategic model has been adopted by the most efficient firm, on 1008 simulations, it 
appears that, after 20 cycles, RBV leads with 56.05% of the cases against 43.95% of the cases 
for IO. Thus, even if RBV firms, has demonstrated table 2, are minority in the top 10 best 
performing firms, in more than half of the cases an RBV firm is the most efficient. This result 
strengthens in cycle 200. Indeed, at this stage, the highest performance, after 1008 
simulations, is reached by an RBV firm in 85.81% of the cases. So, it seems that after 200 
cycles, IO firms have lost the advantage they demonstrated after 20 cycles, and that the best 
performing RBV firms are clearly sustaining a competitive advantage that pays in time.  
 
However, the column "Rel diff av all IO and av all RBV After 200 cycles" gives a result that 
might seem contradictory. Indeed, we see that after 200 cycles, in 98.61% of cases, the IO 
strategic model is binding on the RBV model (1.39%). These results show that firm 
performance varies widely from one RBV firm to another. If the low performing RBV firms 
recuperate a very small competitive advantage after 200 cycles, they are clearly 
underperforming in comparison with IO firms. 
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Indeed, while IO firms’ behavior is fairly homogeneous, RBV firms’ behavior seems much 
more heterogeneous. The analysis of the results of 1008 simulations allows us to identify 
three different types of behavior RBV firms. The first type of RBV firms includes all firms 
that have not been able to quickly get a profitable position on a market in line with their 
resources collection and abilities. In these cases, the performance of these firms is close to 
zero, or even negative. This has a strong impact on the average performance of all RBV 
firms. The second case concerns RBV firms that succeed to reach a market, but on which no 
IO firm decided to get positioned because of a too low expected gain which is too low. The 
performance of these firms is low, but they manage to perform enough to survive. At last, the 
third case concerns hypercompetitive markets. The RBV firms which go on hyper-
competitive markets, where they seem to perform even better than their direct IO 
competitors. This is partly a question of chance because they have the resources collection 
and abilities to face this market. This will be still more obvious when looking at performance 
further in time. One can also consider that those firms are also risk-taking firms, daring to go 
on markets where competition is very intensive, but on which they benefit from competitive 
advantages, that IO firms have still to acquire and fail to maintain. 
 
At this point, the constraints of the model should be taken into account in the analysis of the 
results. Firstly, a random collection of resources given initially to firms does not guarantee 
them to find a market with an RBV decision-making process. Instead, IO firms will always 
find a market that matches their criteria. Secondly, firms can not change their strategy, which 
means that RBV firms are locked once they have found a market, even if it is non profitable. 
Thirdly, firms can easily find resources. Actually, we introduced low constraints on resource 
stocks on the Strategic factor Market. This guarantees IO firms, if they have enough finances, 
to find the relevant resources for any market they would target. If a higher constraint on 
resource availability would be set, this would also eliminate IO firms from the picture, or at 
least make their life more difficult. 
 
We present hereafter (Figure 2) a representative case, compliant with the results of our 1008 
simulations. We compare the evolution of the two dependent variables – instant and total 
performances – all along the 200 simulation periods for the best 5 firms of each strategic 
orientation. Abscissa show time periods while ordinates must be read as monetary units. The 
difference between IO firms (above) and RBV firms (below) is significant for both variables. 
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During the first cycles, the best performing IO firms often demonstrate a higher instant 
performance than RBV firms, but this situation does not last. After this initial period, 
occasionally, the instant performance of one or another IO firm is exceptional, distancing the 
instant performances reached by RBV firms. Between those great feats, coming from a 
successful entry on a highly profitable market, IO firms generally demonstrate a low, if not 
negative, performance. RBV firms, for their part, demonstrate a more sustained performance, 
decreasing naturally with time, but maintained at levels allowing to reinforce continuously 
the position of these firms on the chosen market. 
 
This sustainability of RBV firms’ results gives a total performance growing regularly. On the 
other hand, the total performance of IO firms grows by fits and starts, under the impetus of a 
good instant performance. At the end of the simulation, the regular performance of RBV 
firms pays, since they reach a total performance clearly superior to the one reached by IO 
firms. 
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Figure 2: Graphical representations of the instant and total performances of the 5 best IO (above) and RBV (below) firms,  
for representative simulation among the 1008 simulations 
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6. DISCUSSION 
Saying that the initial instant performance of IO firms is higher is tautological. As a matter of 
fact, the market choice algorithm for IO firms (Teece et al., 1997) is based on market 
expected performance. IO firms target and enter markets promising a higher than average 
performance (Porter, 1991). It is thus normal that, in the short term, their performance is high. 
Nevertheless, the simulations show that IO firms are not good at perpetuating this over-
performance. They reach very high performances but obtain also remarkably disappointing 
performances. When actualizing those performances on the total duration of the simulations, 
highest performances do not compensate lowest performances. This is obviously illustrated 
by the curves presenting total performances (Figure 2) of IO firms. Those curves present 
sharp steps, which show that growth phases are not continuous. On the contrary, IO firms 
undergo performance shocks acting as strong but temporary upsurges, not allowing to reach a 
final high total performance, the firm suffering from the low performance periods. 
 
Inversely, RBV firms present lower instant performances, but realize, in average, less lower 
performances than IO firms; their total performance curve is thus continuous and is exempt 
from shocks.  
 
This is partly explained by “luck and expectations” (Barney, 1986), because some RBV firms 
quickly found a market in which their collection of resources allows them to be successful. 
Thus, the speed with which a firm identifies the market appears suitable as a key to success 
(Teece, 2007). Moreover, when the market is composed of a large number of IO firms 
relative to RBV firms, RBV firms appear to have a performance bonus. The keys of this 
outperformance seem to be daring, speed of reaction and the competitive structure of the 
market through a significant proportion of IO firms. When these conditions are met, the RBV 
strategic model is clearly superior to the IO model. 
 
On the entire simulations time, successful RBV firms succeed to reach a total performance 
higher than IO firms. This result would be consistent with the Penrosian assumption of 
performance sustainability (Barney, 1991, Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt, 1984). It is however 
important to distinguish between the three types of RBV firms (Table 4). 
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Table4: Three RBV Firms' Profiles 
RBV Firms’ Behavior Market Context Consequences 
Wallflowers No match with internal 
resource collection 
Null or negative 
performance; endangered 
survival 
Convenience Marriage Monopoly of RBV firms Low performance 
Soul Mates Hyper-competition with a lot 
of IO firms, with high gains 
expectancy. 
Above IO firms performance 
 
In the majority of the performed simulations, some RBV firms do not find the adequate 
market: since they do not possess the relevant resources to enter one or another of the 
available markets, they keep out of the picture and do not perform at all. We call them 
“Wallflowers”, as they look at other firms without participating in the economic game. If new 
markets appeared or entry conditions change, new opportunities could open for them where 
they could even over-perform as leaders. Since our market structure is static, those firms keep 
their wallflower status forever. Other RBV firms realize an average, if not a low 
performance, since the market that they chose because of its relevance for their internal 
competencies and on which they are installed is not very profitable, even if it allows them to 
survive. Their position on this market is like a “Convenience marriage” that does not provide 
them with the success they could hope but is preferable to be a “wallflower”. At last, the 
highly performing RBV firms combine relevant resources for a given market to the luck that 
this market is very profitable. They consolidate their position on this hyper competitive 
market and perform systematically better than their IO competitors, which enter and leave the 
same market on the basis of, respectively, a high or low expected performance. We call these 
hyper-reactive firms Soul Mates. 
 
We mainly explain the significant performance differences between IO and RBV firms by the 
impact on performance of the different analysis levels of the strategic model and by the 
market competitive structure. First, concerning the level of analysis, RBV and IO processes 
are very different. A firm adopting an IO strategy will necessarily find a market. Since 
market structure is the most important point for those firms (Bain, 1951, 1968; Mason, 1939, 
1957; Porter, 1980a), it is highly likely that a market with the adequate structure exists. For 
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RBV firms, on the contrary, finding a market on which their resource profile (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991) will be the vector of competitive advantage is more difficult. However, 
once such a market is fond, the firm is installed and stable. RBV firms are thus more 
dependent on the configuration of markets than IO firms. 
 
Concerning the market structure, since IO firms can find rapidly a market corresponding to 
their strategic model, they reach also rapidly a high performance, while RBV firms are trying 
to sort themselves out. However, once RBV firms reach a profitable market position, the 
competitive environment and the equilibria between actors change (Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995). Market structures evolve, forcing IO firms to adapt and seek other performance 
sources. At this point, RBV firms are installed and reach a higher performance. IO firms have 
to adapt constantly from market to market, while RBV firms also have to adapt but on a 
mastered market where the learning effect intervenes. IO firms obtain regularly over-
performances when they move on a new market, but this over-performance is not sustainable 
and must be renewed. RBV firms, for their part, reach weaker but more regular performances. 
At the end of the simulation, after 200 periods, the sustainability of RBV firms seems to pay 
more than the feats of IO firms. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study is to determine which strategic model, either IO or RBV, allows firms 
to reach the highest performance on a competitive market. Contrasting with classical studies 
that mobilize analyses as VARCOMP, we deploy a multi-agent system simulating the 
behavior of firms adopting RBV or IO strategic models. This research shows that, in a market 
with perfect competition composed of 200 firms and 20 markets, firms that have adopted the 
IO strategic model access more quickly to a very high performance. However, after a large 
number of periods, the highest performing firms are generally RBV firms. 
 
In our view, the volatility in the results obtained in previous studies, summarized table 1, and 
the high level of error regularly obtained, are partly due to the versatility of RBV firms. 
Indeed, there is a very large variance in performance generated by RBV firms according to 
the type of firm (table 4). Thus, the results obtained in the precedent studies are based on the 
analysis of performance variance. In our view, the very different results obtained must be 
linked with the proportions of RBV firm of one kind or another in the population studied. 
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However, it is necessary to take these results for what they are. Indeed, the data used for our 
analysis are simulated data based on an algorithm that we developed based on theory. This 
research is therefore limited to the theoretical world, and this is fundamental. The pitfall of 
this type of research is to indulge the temptation to transpose early results in purely 
theoretical empirical recommendations. This transposition is neither founded, nor desirable, 
and in no cases our approach. Our objective was to determine the strategic model for the firm 
to generate more performance in a competitive market. This approach is based on a set of 
theoretical propositions that lead us to conclude that firms adopting the RBV strategic model 
access, on average, over a long period, and in the specific conditions of our simulations, to a 
significantly higher performance than that generated by firms IO.  
 29 
 
References 
Alchian AA, Demsetz H. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. 
The American Economic Review 62(5): 777-795 
Amit R, Schoemaker PJH. 1993. Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent. Strategic 
Management Journal 14(1): 33-46 
Arena R, Lazaric N. 2003. La théorie évolutionniste du changement économique de Nelson et 
Winter. Revue économique 54(2): 329-354 
Arend RJ. 2009. Industry effects and firm effects: No effect is an island. Journal of Business 
Research 62(6): 651-659 
Bain JS. 1951. Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing 
1936-1940. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65(4): 602 
Bain JS. 1968. Industrial organization. John Wiley and Sons: New York 
Barney J. 1991. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of 
Management 17: 90-120 
Barney J. 1997. Gaining and sustaining competitive advantage. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.: 
pp. 570 
Barney JB. 1986. Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business Strategy. 
Management Science 32(10): 1231-1241 
Barney JB. 1996. The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm. Organization Science 7(5): 469 
Baumol WJ. 1982. Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure. 
The American Economic Review 72(1): 1-15 
Baumol WJ, Willig RD. 1981. Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of 
Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 96(3): 405-431 
Becker I, Niehaves B, Klose K. 2005. A framework for epistemological perspectives on 
simulation. Journal of artificial societies and social simulation 8(4) 
Capon N, Farley JU, Hoenig S. 1990. Determinants of Financial Performance: A Meta-
Analysis. Management Science 36(10): 1143-1159 
Chatterjee S, Wernerfelt B. 1991. The Link between Resources and Type of Diversification: 
Theory and Evidence. Strategic Management Journal 12(1): 33-48 
Conner KR. 1991a. A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of 
Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm? 
Journal of Management 17: 121 
Conner KR. 1991b. A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of 
Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm? 
Journal of Management 17(1): 121 
Demazeau Y, Müller J-P. 1990. Decentralized Artificial Intelligence. in Decentralized A.I., 
Y.Demazeau & J.P. Müller Eds, Elsevier 
Dierickx I, Cool K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive 
advantage. Management Science 35: 1504-1511 
Durand R. 1997. Management stratégique des ressources et performance des firmes. Une 
étude des entreprises manufacturières françaises (1993-1996). HEC 
Durand R. 2000. Entreprise et évolution économique. Belin 
Eisenhardt KM, Martin JA. 2000. Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They? Strategic 
Management Journal 21(10/11): 1105-1121 
Foss NJ, Knudsen Tr. 2003. The Resource-Based Tangle: Towards a Sustainable Explanation 
of Competitive Advantage. Managerial and Decision Economics 24(4): 291-307 
Gilbert N, Conte R. 1994. Simulating societies: The Computer Simulation of Social 
Phenomena. UCL Press, London 
Gilbert N, Troitzsch KG. 2005. Simulation for the Social Scientist Open University Press 
 30 
 
Grant RM. 1991. The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for 
Strategy Formulation. California Management Review 33(3): 114-135 
Grant RM. 1996. Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm. Strategic Management 
Journal 17: 109-122 
Hamel G. 1991. Competition for Competence and Inter-Partner Learning Within International 
Strategic Alliances. Strategic Management Journal 12: 83-103 
Hamel G, Heene A. 1994. Competence-based competition. Wiley: New York 
Harrison JR, Zhiang LIN, Carroll GR, Carley KM. 2007. Simulation modeling in 
organizational and management research. Academy of Management Review 32(4): 1229-1245 
Hawawini G, Subramanian V, Verdin P. 2003. Is performance driven by industry-or firm-
specific factors? A new look at the evidence. Strategic Management Journal 24(1): 1-16 
Helfat C, Finkelstein S, Mitchell W. 2007. Dynamic capabilities: understanding strategic 
change in organizations. Blackwell publishers 
Lee DD, Madhavan R. 2010. Divestiture and Firm Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of 
Management 36(6): 1345-1371 
Mahoney JT, Pandian JR. 1992. The Resource-Based View Within the Conversation of 
Strategic Management. Strategic Management Journal 13(5): 363-380 
Makadok R. 2001. Toward a Synthesis of the Resource-Based and Dynamic-Capability 
Views of Rent Creation. Strategic Management Journal 22(5): 387-401 
Mason ES. 1939. Price and production policies of large-scale enterprise. American Economic 
Review 29: 61-74 
Mason ES. 1957. Economic concentration and the monopoly problem: Cambridge, 
Massachussets 
McGahan AM, Porter ME. 1997. How Much Does Industry Matter, Really? Strategic 
Management Journal 18: 15-30 
Milgrom P, Roberts J. 1995. Complementarities and fit: Strategy, structure, and 
organizational change in manufacturing, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 19:  179-
208 
Moss S, Edmonds B. 2005. Towards good social signs. Journal of artificial societies and 
social simulation 8(4) 
Nelson RR, Winter SG. 1973. Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Economic Capabilities. The 
American Economic Review 63(2): 440-449 
Penrose E. 1955. Limits to the Growth and Size of Firms. The American Economic Review 
45(2): 531-543 
Penrose ET. 1952. Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm. The American Economic 
Review 42(5): 804-819 
Penrose ET. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Basic Blackwell: Oxford 
Peteraf MA. 1993. The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-Based View. 
Strategic Management Journal 14(3): 179-191 
Peteraf MA, Barney JB. 2003. Unraveling the Resource-Based Tangle. Managerial and 
Decision Economics 24(4): 309-323 
Porter M. 1980a. Competitive strategy: techniques for analysis industries and competitors. 
Free press: New York 
Porter ME. 1979. The Structure within Industries and Companies' Performance. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 61(2): 214-227 
Porter ME. 1980b. Industry Structure and Competitive Strategy: Keys to Profitability. 
Financial Analysts Journal 36(4): 30-41 
Porter ME. 1991. Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy. Strategic Management Journal 12: 
95-117 
Porter ME. 1996. What is Strategy? Harvard Business Review 75: 156-157 
 31 
 
Porter ME. 2008. The five competitive forces that shape strategy. Harvard Business Review 
86: 78-93 
Powell TC. 1996. How Much Does Industry Matter? An Alternative Empirical Test. Strategic 
Management Journal 17(4): 323-334 
Prahalad CK, Hamel G. 1990. The Core Competence of the Corporation. Harvard Business 
Review 68: 79-91 
Ricardo D. 1817. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. General Books LLC (2009) 
Roquebert JA, Phillips RL, Westfall PA. 1996. Markets vs. Management: What 'Drives' 
Profitability? Strategic Management Journal 17(8): 653-664 
Rumelt R. 1974. Strategy, structure and economic performance. Division of research, 
graduate school of business administration: Boston, Harvard University 
Rumelt RP. 1991. How Much Does Industry Matter? Strategic Management Journal 12(3): 
167-185 
Scherer FM, Ross D. 1990. Industrial market structure and economic performance. 
Houghton Mifflin: Boston 
Schmalensee R. 1985. Do Markets Differ Much? The American Economic Review 75(3): 
341-351 
Schumpeter J. 1951. Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie (G Fain, Trans.) (2eme ed.). 
Payot 
Spender JC. 1996. Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm. Strategic 
Management Journal 17: 45-62 
Spender JC, Grant RM. 1996. Knowledge and the Firm: Overview. Strategic Management 
Journal 17: 5-9 
Teece DJ. 2007. Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal 28: 1319-1350 
Teece DJ, Pisano G, Shuen A. 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management. 
Strategic Management Journal 18(7): 509-533 
Tsoukas H. 1996. The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System: A Constructionist 
Approach. Strategic Management Journal 17: 11-25 
Van de Ven AH, Poole MS. 1995. Explaining Development and Change in Organizations. 
The Academy of Management Review 20(3): 510-540 
Wernerfelt B. 1984. A Resource-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management Journal 
5(2): 171-180 
Wernerfelt B, Montgomery CA. 1988. Tobin's q and the Importance of Focus in Firm 
Performance. The American Economic Review 78(1): 246-250 
Williamson OE. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications. Free 
Press: New York 
Williamson OE. 1985. Economic institutions of capitalism. Free Press: New York 
Williamson OE. 1991. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36(2): 269-296 
Winter S. 1990. Survival, selection, and inheritance in evolutionary theories of organization, 
Organization evolution-new directions:  269-297. Sage: Newbury park (cal.) 
Zollo M, Winter SG. 2002. Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities. 
Organization Science 13(3): 339-351 
Zott C. 2003. Dynamic capabilities and the emergence of intraindustry differential firm 
performance: insights from a simulation study. Strategic Management Journal 24(2): 97-125 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Appendix 1: Synthesis of the results at the end of the 20 cycles, for the 1008 simulations 
 
Nb. 
IO 
in 
best 
10 
Nb. 
RBV 
in 
best 
10 
Perf. 
1st 
IO 
Perf. 
1st 
RBV 
Av. 
Perf. 
5 
Best 
IO 
Av. 
Perf. 
5 
Best 
RBV 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
IO 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
RBV 
Av. 
Perf. 
all 
IO 
Av. 
Perf. 
all 
RBV 
Rel diff 
between 
best IO 
and 
best 
RBVa 
Rel diff 
between 
av 5 
best IO 
and av 
5 best 
RBVb 
Rel diff 
between 
av 10 
best IO 
and av 
10 best 
RBVc 
Rel diff 
av all 
IO and 
av all 
RBVd 
Average 5,55 4,45 3447,23 3528,57 3259,60 3220,39 3146,82 3011,54 2511,61 1497,58 -0,01 0,03 0,06 0,82 
St. dev. 2,71 2,71 253,39 458,88 205,95 318,48 193,73 320,26 203,82 319,37 0,16 0,16 0,20 1,05 
Variance 7,36 7,36 64204,78 210568,59 42413,81 101429,62 37530,87 102567,34 41541,46 101994,28 0,03 0,03 0,04 1,09 
Median 6,00 4,00 3444,99 3483,70 3265,81 3234,13 3156,50 3052,31 2526,48 1512,14 -0,02 0,00 0,03 0,66 
Maxima 10,00 10,00 4152,83 4962,37 3873,67 4040,90 3673,89 3715,42 2999,23 2340,96 1,42 1,98 2,37 19,42 
Minima 0,00 0,00 2673,57 1463,60 2595,96 1178,91 2533,42 1002,85 1796,39 127,59 -0,37 -0,28 -0,24 -0,05 
        
Nb of cases where IO > RBV 443,00 511,00 605,00 1007,00 
        
Nb of cases where IO < RBV 565,00 497,00 403,00 1,00 
        
% of cases where IO > RBV 43,95% 50,69% 60,02% 99,90% 
        
% of cases where IO < RBV 56,05% 49,31% 39,98% 0,10% 
 
Where : 
a : Relative difference between the best performing IO and RBV firms : (Best IO – Best RBV)/Best RBV  
b : Relative difference between the average performance of the 5 best performing IO and RBV firms: (Best5IO – Best5RBV) / Best5RBV 
c : Relative difference between the average performance of 10 best performing IO and RBV firms : (Best10IO – Best10RBV) / Best10RBV 
d : Relative difference between the average performance of all remaining IO and RBV firms : (AvIO – AvRBV) / AvRB 
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Appendix 2: Synthesis of the results at the end of the 200 cycles, for the 1008 simulations 
 
Nb. 
IO 
in 
best 
10 
Nb. 
RBV 
in 
best 
10 
Perf. 
1st 
IO 
Perf. 
1st 
RBV 
Av. 
Perf. 
5 
Best 
IO 
Av. 
Perf. 
5 
Best 
RBV 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
IO 
Av. 
Perf. 
10 
Best 
RBV 
Av. 
Perf. 
all 
IO 
Av. 
Perf. 
all 
RBV 
Rel diff 
between 
best IO 
and 
best 
RBVa 
Rel diff 
between 
av 5 
best IO 
and av 
5 best 
RBVb 
Rel diff 
between 
av 10 
best IO 
and av 
10 best 
RBVc 
Rel diff 
av all 
IO and 
av all 
RBVd 
Average 3,93 6,07 5582,62 6654,33 5432,62 5985,43 5339,84 5585,26 4688,70 3055,44 -0,14 -0,08 -0,02 0,66 
St. dev. 3,27 3,27 294,05 937,24 287,43 632,86 292,25 616,07 344,52 615,50 0,17 0,17 0,20 0,89 
Variance 10,68 10,68 86465,27 878420,96 82618,84 400512,42 85412,89 379540,78 118696,02 378843,46 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,80 
Median 4,00 6,00 5597,86 6587,88 5443,05 6038,91 5350,85 5668,28 4714,08 3118,80 -0,15 -0,10 -0,05 0,51 
Maxima 10,00 10,00 6432,88 8490,24 6218,90 7566,40 6098,50 6812,13 5565,26 4546,53 2,08 2,35 2,60 14,25 
Minima 0,00 0,00 4535,61 1827,73 4433,78 1672,18 4298,64 1560,73 3546,94 311,36 -0,42 -0,36 -0,32 -0,16 
        
Nb of cases where IO > RBV 143,00 195,00 331,00 994,00 
        
Nb of cases where IO < RBV 865,00 813,00 677,00 14,00 
        
% of cases where IO > RBV 14,19 % 19,35 % 32,84 % 98,61 % 
        
% of cases where IO < RBV 85,81 % 80,65 % 67,16 % 1,39 % 
 
Where : 
a : Relative difference between the best performing IO and RBV firms : (Best IO – Best RBV)/Best RBV  
b : Relative difference between the average performance of the 5 best performing IO and RBV firms: (Best5IO – Best5RBV) / Best5RBV 
c : Relative difference between the average performance of 10 best performing IO and RBV firms : (Best10IO – Best10RBV) / Best10RBV 
d : Relative difference between the average performance of all remaining IO and RBV firms : (AvIO – AvRBV) / AvRB 
